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Abstract—The broadcast channel with confidential messages
is a well studied scenario from the theoretical standpoint, but
there is still lack of practical schemes able to achieve some
fixed level of reliability and security over such a channel. In this
paper, we consider a quasi-static fading channel in which both
public and private messages must be sent from the transmitter
to the receivers, and we aim at designing suitable coding and
modulation schemes to achieve such a target. For this purpose,
we adopt the error rate as a metric, by considering that reliability
(security) is achieved when a sufficiently low (high) error rate is
experienced at the receiving side. We show that some conditions
exist on the system feasibility, and that some outage probability
must be tolerated to cope with the fading nature of the channel.
The proposed solution exploits low-density parity-check codes
with unequal error protection, which are able to guarantee two
different levels of protection against noise for the public and the
private information, in conjunction with different modulation
schemes for the public and the private message bits.
Index Terms—Broadcast channel with confidential messages,
low-density parity-check codes, physical layer security, quasi-
static fading channel, unequal error protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the basic transmission models for physical layer
security is the broadcast channel with confidential messages
(BCC) [1]. In this model, there is one transmitter (Alice) who
sends both broadcast and confidential information over the
channel. The authorized receiver (Bob) is able to decode the
whole information, while the non-authorized receiver (Eve)
can only have access to the public information, but she should
be unable to obtain the confidential information. Bob’s and
Eve’s channels are generally different one each other. A
practical context in which the BCC model can be applied is
the integration of multiple services at the physical layer. For
example, a wireless network could provide a free broadcast
service to all users, and also exploit the same channel to
provide another service which is restricted to a subset of users.
The BCC model has been extensively studied from the in-
formation theory standpoint, mostly with the aim of computing
the secrecy capacity regions. This has been done for Gaussian
variants of the BCC [2], [3] and also by considering the case of
fading channels [4]–[8]. More recently, the secrecy capacity
regions have been studied for the BCC with multiple-input
This work was supported in part by the MIUR project “ESCAPADE” (Grant
RBFR105NLC) under the “FIRB – Futuro in Ricerca 2010” funding program.
multiple-output (MIMO) [9]–[11] and cooperative communi-
cations [12]. In many of these works, coding is considered
as an important tool for achieving the reliability and security
targets over the BCC, but the abstract model of random coding
is often considered [13], and the design of practical coding
schemes is not addressed. At the authors’ best knowledge,
only one proposal of using polar codes as practical codes
for transmissions over the discrete memoryless BCC has very
recently appeared [14], while no practical solution exists for
continuous-output BCCs.
In this work, we consider another important class of power-
ful error correcting codes, namely low-density parity-check
(LDPC) codes, and propose a practical scheme to achieve
reliable and secure transmission of public and private in-
formation over the BCC. In order to consider a practically
meaningful scenario, our analysis is focused on the case of
quasi-static fading channel (QSFC) for both Bob and Eve.
Following some previous literature [15], [16], the reliability
and security performance is measured on the basis of the
decoding error probabilities experienced at the receiving side.
This way, practical coding schemes can be easily assessed and
compared, as we have already done for the Gaussian wire-tap
channel [17]–[19].
We show that a transmission scheme able to provide two
different levels of protection against noise is needed to achieve
the transmission reliability and security targets over the BCC.
For this reason, we use some LDPC codes having unequal
error protection (UEP) [20], [21]. We consider different mod-
ulation formats for the private information bits, and we show
that high order modulations are needed.
The organization of the paper is as follows: in Section
II we define the system model and the metrics we use. In
Section III we address the system feasibility and compute the
outage probability for Bob and Eve. In Section IV we describe
the UEP LDPC codes we propose to use in this context. In
Section V we provide and discuss some numerical examples,
and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND METRICS
The channel model we consider is shown in Fig. 1. Both
Bob’s and Eve’s channels are Rayleigh fading, with fading
coefficients hB and hE , respectively, and also affected by
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Fig. 1. Fading wire-tap channel model.
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), nB and nE . We
suppose that Bob’s and Eve’s channels are QSFCs, that is, their
fading coefficients do not vary during the transmission of each
codeword, while they can be modeled as Rayleigh random
variables over different codewords. The signal-to-noise ratios
(SNRs) of Bob’s and Eve’s channels are usually different.
Therefore, the two vectors received by Bob and Eve, cB and
cE , are also different, as well as the two messages they get
after decoding, noted by uB and uE , respectively. Bob is an
authorized receiver, able to decode the whole information. Eve
instead is a non-authorized receiver, able to get only the public
message information, whereas she should be unable to obtain
any useful information on the secret message.
Each transmitted message is formed by n bits and includes
a public and a confidential part. Since we use error correcting
coding, each transmitted message contains k information bits
and r = n− k redundancy bits. The overall code rate is R =
k
n , and R also coincides with the overall information rate,
expressed in bits per channel use, when we use binary phase
shift keying (BPSK) modulation. The transmitted information
bits can be divided into a block of ks ≤ k secret information
bits, and another block of kp = k−ks public information bits.
The SNRs on the two channels, noted by γ(B) and γ(E),
result from the combination of the AWGN contribution and
the Rayleigh fading contribution. The average SNRs are equal
to γ¯(B) and γ¯(E) for Bob and Eve, respectively. According
to the Rayleigh fading model, hB and hE are two Rayleigh
random variables, whose real and imaginary parts are Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and variance 1/2. Therefore,
|hB|
2 and |hE |2 are chi-square distributed, with average value
E(|hB |
2) = E(|hE |
2) = 1. It follows that the probability
density functions of γ(B) and γ(E) are:
pγ(B)(x) =
1
γ¯(B)
e−x/γ¯
(B)
, x ≥ 0 (1a)
pγ(E)(x) =
1
γ¯(E)
e−x/γ¯
(E)
, x ≥ 0 (1b)
We suppose to have average channel state information
(CSI), that is, Alice knows the values of γ¯(B) and γ¯(E).
Several works in the literature assume to have perfect CSI,
that is, Alice knows exactly the values of γ(B) and γ(E) for
each transmitted codeword. We prefer to make the assumption
of having only average CSI, since it is more realistic for a
practical system like the one we want to address.
A. Reliability and security targets
In order to design practical coding and modulation schemes
for the considered BCC, we need some metrics which allow to
take into account and assess the performance achieved by each
specific instance of the system. For this purpose, we adopt the
error rate as a metric both for reliability and security.
Let P (γ) denote the overall frame error rate (FER) as a
function of the SNR γ. In other terms, P (γ) is the probability
that one or more of the k information bits are in error within
a received frame of n bits. Since each block of k information
bits contains a public and a secret part, we denote by Pp(γ)
and Ps(γ) the block error rate (BLER) for each of these two
parts, respectively.
As done in some recent literature [15]–[19], we define the
security and reliability targets in terms of the decoding error
probabilities experienced by Bob and Eve. Given two small
threshold values, δ and ǫ, we define the security and reliability
targets as follows:
Pp(γ
(B)) ≤ δ, (2a)
Pp(γ
(E)) ≤ δ, (2b)
Ps(γ
(B)) ≤ δ, (2c)
Ps(γ
(E)) ≥ 1− ǫ. (2d)
Conditions (2a)-(2c) ensure the desired reliability, while
(2d) guarantees a sufficiently large error probability on the
secret information at Eve’s. Having defined the security target
in terms of the BLER, one could object that, when a block is
in error, this does not necessarily mean that its bits are erred
with probability 0.5 (which would be the desired maximum
uncertainty condition from the information theory standpoint).
Therefore, we cannot state that the system achieves perfect
secrecy. However, we can say that the system achieves a looser
notion of weak secrecy, as defined in [22]. In fact, when Eve’s
BLER on the secret information is almost 1, we know that she
has some uncertainty on the secret information bits. This small
amount of uncertainty can be exploited to achieve a desired
higher level of security through suitable transformations. For
example, an all-or-nothing transform (AONT) [23] can be used
to link a set of transmitted blocks together, in such a way that
their information can be recovered only when all of them are
decoded without errors. Several examples of AONTs can be
found in the literature. When transmission occurs over noisy
channels, like in this case, we have shown in [17]–[19], [24]
that scrambling the information bits through a linear (and
dense) map can be sufficient to approach an AONT, thanks
to the randomness of the errors induced by the channel.
On the other hand, using the error rate as a reliability and
security metric imposes some restrictions on our analysis. First
of all, the error rate depends on the decoder. Therefore, we
should suppose that Eve uses an optimal decoder to attack
the system, that is, a maximum likelihood (ML) decoder
for continuous-output channels. However, for sufficiently long
LDPC codes, it is known that belief propagation iterative
decoders are able to approach the ML decoding performance.
Therefore, we can consider the performance achieved by Eve
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Fig. 2. Expected block error rate curves for the public and secret messages
as functions of the SNR.
through iterative decoding as a reliable estimate of the optimal
decoder performance. This also avoids the need to consider
that Eve uses other decoders, like, for example, those based
on ordered statistics decoding (OSD) algorithms [25], which
exploit the concept of information set decoding (ISD) [26],
aided by the soft information available at the channel output.
An algorithm similar to ISD was also proposed in [27] to
attack two authentication protocols which exploit some noisy
observations. In that case, however, the attacker can also take
advantage of the fact that a fixed secret key is used as the
starting point to compute the transmitted data.
Finally, we observe that the secrecy condition we define by
using the error rate as a metric is also weak in that it may imply
to transmit at a secret rate which is smaller than the equivoca-
tion rate at Eve’s. Therefore, there may be some leakage on the
confidential information part which must be compensated for
by using higher layer techniques (like AONTs). Estimating
the equivocation rate of this system and introducing some
modifications (like the use of some intentional randomness)
to achieve a secret rate which approaches the equivocation
rate will be the object of future works.
III. SYSTEM FEASIBILITY AND OUTAGE
Let us suppose that we use a coding and modulation scheme
which offers a higher level of protection against noise to the
public information part with respect to the secret information
part. Typical error rate curves for this case are reported in
Fig. 2, where βp and βs denote the minimum SNRs which
are needed to meet the reliability conditions on the public and
the secret information, respectively, while αs is the maximum
SNR which is allowed to meet the security condition on the
secret information.
Based on the Pp and Ps curves, we can rewrite the con-
ditions (2) in terms of γ(B) and γ(E). In fact, the conditions
(2a) and (2c) are equivalent to set
γ(B) ≥ max {βp, βs} = βs, (3)
while the conditions (2b) and (2d) are satisfied if and only if
βp ≤ γ
(E) ≤ αs. (4)
Since 1 − ǫ > δ by definition, it follows that the condition
(4) can be met only when the public information is more
protected against noise than the secret information, that is the
situation depicted in Fig. 2. We observe that, in this context,
the condition in which Eve has a degraded channel with
respect to Bob does not suffice to make the system feasible
as it occurs for the wire-tap channel model. In principle, the
system is feasible even when αs = βp. In practice, however,
we need that αs > βp to ensure that the system remains
feasible even when γ(E) has some fluctuations, like in the
case of fading channels we consider, as we will discuss next.
Provided that the system is feasible, we can assess and com-
pare different coding and modulation schemes by computing
the security gap Sg , which is defined as the ratio between the
limit values of Bob’s and Eve’s SNRs which are needed to
meet the reliability and security conditions. Designing coding
and modulation schemes which achieve small security gaps is
important, since this means that reliability and security can be
achieved even with a small degradation of Eve’s channel with
respect to Bob’s channel.
A. Bob’s outage
When Bob receives a transmitted codeword, he must be able
to meet the reliability conditions (2a) and (2c). From (3) we
have that both these conditions are met when γ(B) ≥ βs, hence
an outage event occurs when γ(B) < βs. We denote by η the
probability of such an event, and from (1a) we have
η = P
{
0 ≤ γ(B) < βs
}
=
∫ βs
0
pγ(B)(x)dx
= 1− exp
(
−
βs
γ¯(B)
)
. (5)
We suppose to have average CSI on both channels, hence
the transmission power can be chosen such that the probability
of outage is not greater than some fixed value ηmax, that is:
γ¯(B) ≥ γ¯
(B)
min = −
βs
ln (1− ηmax)
. (6)
B. Eve’s outage
When Eve receives a transmitted codeword, two outage
events can occur:
• The reliability condition (2b) on the public information
is not met. We define ωr the probability of this event.
• The security condition (2d) on the secret information is
not met. We define ωs the probability of this event.
Based on (1b), we have
ωr = P
{
0 ≤ γ(E) < βp
}
=
∫ βp
0
pγ(E)(x)dx
= 1− exp
(
−
βp
γ¯(E)
)
(7)
and
ωs = P
{
γ(E) > αs
}
=
∫ ∞
αs
pγ(E)(x)dx
= exp
(
−
αs
γ¯(E)
)
. (8)
Since the two outage events are incompatible, the overall
outage probability for Eve is
ω = ωr + ωs = 1− exp
(
−
βp
γ(E)
)
+ exp
(
−
αs
γ(E)
)
. (9)
As we suppose to have average CSI on both channels, we
can assume that γ¯(E) is chosen in such a way that ω equals its
minimum, ωmin. This optimal value of γ¯(E), named γ¯(E)opt , can
be easily found by computing the derivative of ω with respect
to γ¯(E), that is,
dω
dγ¯(E)
=
αs exp
(
− αs
γ¯(E)
)
− βp exp
(
−
βp
γ¯(E)
)
(γ¯(E))2
. (10)
Then, γ¯(E)opt is obtained by setting dωdγ¯(E) = 0. This way, we
have
γ¯
(E)
opt =
βp − αs
ln
(
βp
αs
) . (11)
Therefore, by taking Bob’s and Eve’s outage probabilities
(i.e., ηmax and ωmin) into account, we can compute the
security gap as
Sg =
γ¯
(B)
min
γ¯
(E)
opt
. (12)
IV. UEP LDPC CODES FOR THE BCC
In order to achieve the two levels of protection which are
requested for the public and the secret information blocks, we
use an LDPC code with UEP. We are interested in finding
an UEP LDPC code with a length of n bits, able to achieve
two different levels of protection against noise on the set of
k < n information bits. This requirement fits well with several
design approaches proposed in the literature [20], [21], [28],
which aim at dividing the codeword bits into three protection
classes (PCs), named PC1, PC2 and PC3, respectively:
• The PC1 contains k1 < k information bits which are the
most protected against noise.
• The PC2 contains k2 = k − k1 information bits which
are less protected against noise than those in PC1.
• The PC3 contains the r = n− k redundancy bits.
Hence, for the use in the considered scenario, we can
design a code with these three PCs, and then map the public
information bits into PC1 (i.e., kp = k1) and the secret
information bits into PC2 (i.e., ks = k2).
Codes of this kind can be obtained by designing suitable
node degree distributions and then grouping the codeword bits
based on their node degrees. More in detail, first of all, the
variable node degree distribution must be chosen in such a
way as to achieve a good convergence threshold under iterative
decoding. To have UEP, instead, the degree distribution must
include both very low and rather high variable node degrees.
Since the highest degrees ensure greater protection, the vari-
able nodes with such degrees which correspond to information
bits form the PC1. Among the remaining variable nodes, with
low degrees, those corresponding to information bits form the
PC2. Finally, the variable nodes associated to redundancy bits
form the PC3.
The design starts from an optimized variable node degree
distribution from the edge perspective, which is expressed as a
polynomial, λ(x) =
∑dv
i=1 λix
i−1
, with real coefficients. The
coefficient λi coincides with the fraction of edges connected
to variable nodes having degree i, and dv is the maximum
variable node degree. Then, λ(x) is converted from the edge
perspective to the node perspective, thus obtaining the poly-
nomial ν(x) =
∑dv
i=1 νix
i
, whose coefficients νi are related
to the λi’s as follows:
νi =
λi/i∑dv
j=1 λj/j
,
λi =
νi · i∑dv
j=1 νj · j
. (13)
The node perspective is useful to assign the variable node
bits to the PCs. In particular, the number of bits in PC1,
that is the most protected class, is computed by summing the
fractions of nodes (i.e., the values of νi) corresponding to the
highest values of i (i.e., to the highest variable node degrees).
The same reasoning can be applied to the check nodes
degree distributions, by denoting with ρ(x) and c(x) the
check node degree distributions from the edge and the node
perspectives, respectively, and by replacing λ with ρ, ν with c,
and dv with dc, where dc is the maximum check node degree.
Concerning the design of the check node degree distribution,
we adopt a concentrated distribution (i.e., with only two
degrees, concentrated around the mean). This solution has
the advantage of being very simple, while achieving good
performance. This way, we obtain
c(x) = ax⌊cm⌋ + bx⌈cm⌉, (14)
where cm = Er =
∑
j
vj ·j
(1−R) and E is the total number of edges
in the Tanner graph. The values a and b are computed as
a = ⌈cm⌉ − cm, b = cm − ⌊cm⌋. (15)
Once having designed the variable and check nodes degree
distributions, a practical code with an arbitrary finite length
can be obtained by designing its r× n parity-check matrix in
such a way as to match the two degree distributions. This can
be accomplished through several algorithms. Among them, we
adopt the zigzag-random construction [21], [29].
Since we use these codes to map the first two PCs to the
public and the secret information bits, it is advisable to ensure
that a high level of separation exists between these two classes,
in such a way that possible fluctuations of the error rate on
one of them do not affect the error rate on the other. For
this purpose, we design the parity-check matrix in such a way
as to keep the number of parity-check equations which are
common between the first two PCs as small as possible, while
still achieving good performance.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONSIDERED CODING AND MODULATION
SCHEMES (ALL VALUES ARE IN DB, EXCEPT THE OUTAGE PROBABILITY)
Scheme αs
ωmin
γ¯
(E)
opt
βs γ¯
(B)
min
Sg
(ηmax)
BPSK 2.95 0.81 1.90 5.35 3.14 1.24
64 QAM 12.25 0.24 7.70 14.12 19.73 12.03
128 QAM 15.78 0.13 10.25 17.67 26.23 15.98
512 QAM 20.64 0.05 13.99 22.94 35.84 21.85
2048 QAM 25.27 0.02 17.73 28.49 45.44 27.71
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In order to provide some numerical examples, we consider
an UEP LDPC code with n = 4096 and overall code rate
R = 1/2. Its variable nodes degree distribution is taken from
[20, Table 3], with some minor modifications which are needed
to change the proportion between the PC1 and the PC2:
λ(x) = 0.0025x19 + 0.0009x18 + 0.0031x17 + 0.0630x16+
+ 0.3893x15 + 0.2985x2 + 0.2427x. (16)
The corresponding degree distribution from the node perspec-
tive is
ν(x) = 0.0005x20 + 0.0002x19 + 0.0007x18 + 0.0151x17+
+ 0.0835x16 + 0.4054x3 + 0.4946x2. (17)
We observe from (17) that the variable nodes can be grouped
into two classes with node degrees ≤ 3 or ≥ 16. Therefore,
the nodes in PC1 will be those having degree ≥ 16, while the
others will be in PC2 or PC3, depending on their association
to information or redundancy bits. This way, we find that
PC1 and PC2 contain, respectively, 20% and 80% of the
information bits.
The performance of this code has been assessed by sim-
ulating transmission over a Gaussian channel with SNR per
bit equal to γ, and by performing decoding through the log-
likelihood ratio sum-product algorithm (LLR-SPA). The bits in
the PC1 are always transmitted by using BPSK modulation,
while for the bits in the PC2 several quadrature amplitude
modulation (QAM) formats have also been tested. For the
latter, we have adopted the labeling known as Yarg [30], which
has been suitably designed for physical layer security contexts.
Concerning QAM transmissions, they have been implemented
through a pragmatic approach, by mapping groups of bits into
QAM symbols, and then using a classical symbol-to-bit soft
metric conversion before LDPC decoding. The performance
obtained, in terms of Pp(γ) and Ps(γ), is reported in Fig. 3.
We fix two values for the reliability and security thresholds,
that is, δ = 10−4 and ǫ = 0.1. Based on these choices,
from Fig. 3 we obtain βp = 0.75 dB, while αs and βs
vary according to the modulation scheme used for the secret
information bits. The values taken by αs and βs for the
considered modulation schemes are reported in Table I.
Starting from the values of αs and βs, we can compute
Eve’s overall outage probability ω (9), as a function of Eve’s
average SNR per bit, γ¯(E). The values of ω, so obtained,
are reported in Fig. 4 for the considered secret information
modulation formats. Then, the value of ωmin is easily obtained,
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Fig. 3. Error rate curves for an UEP LDPC code with length 4096 and
PC1 and PC2 with proportions 20%− 80%. The bits in the PC1 are always
BPSK modulated, while the performance of several QAM schemes with Yarg
labeling on the bits in the PC2 is reported.
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as well as the value of γ¯(E)opt for which ω = ωmin. These values
can be found according to the procedure described in Section
III-B, and are also reported in Table I. Concerning Bob, we
have fixed a maximum outage probability ηmax = ωmin, and
computed the corresponding minimum value of his average
SNR per bit, γ¯(B)min, according to (6). The values of γ¯(B)min, so
obtained, are also reported in Table I.
Based on these results, we observe that, when both the
public and the secret information bits are modulated with
BPSK, the outage probability for Eve is always very large
(more than 0.8). Therefore, although the system is theoretically
feasible, in practice the fading nature of the channel rarely
allows to achieve a successful transmission. The situation
improves by adopting higher modulation orders for the private
information bits, which also increases the values of αs. This
way, the outage probability for Eve is progressively reduced.
When we adopt a QAM scheme with 2048 symbols, Eve’s
outage probability can be reduced down to 0.02. Under the
hypothesis that Bob’s outage probability is the same as Eve’s
outage probability (or less), we observe that there is a tradeoff
between the outage probability and the security gap. In fact, if
we are able to tolerate a high probability of outage, the system
requires small security gaps (in the order of 10 dBs or even
less). Instead, if we aim at small outage probabilities, we need
large security gaps (in the order of 20 or 30 dBs).
On the other hand, high values of the outage probability
(which mean that the system is often in outage) may be
not much appealing in practice. However, as often occurs in
physical layer security, the proposed coding and modulation
scheme is able to offer a basic level of reliability and security,
which can be then exploited by higher layer protocols and
algorithms to reach the desired performance. Some examples
of higher layer techniques of this kind are automatic repeat
request protocols, to improve the transmission reliability, and
AONTs acting on groups of concatenated blocks, to improve
the transmission security without the need of any shared secret.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the BCC with quasi-static fading from a
practical standpoint, by using the decoding error probability
as a metric. We have proposed some practical coding and
modulation schemes which can achieve some fixed reliability
and security targets over this channel.
We have computed closed form expressions for the probabil-
ity of outage at Bob’s and Eve’s, and assessed the security gap
which is needed between their channels under the hypothesis
of average CSI.
Our results show that high order modulation schemes are
advisable for the secret information bits in order to achieve
reasonably low values of the outage probability, although this
yields some increase in the security gap.
As anticipated in Section II-A, future works will involve
the assessment of the performance achievable in terms of
the equivocation rate at Eve’s, and the optimization of the
coding and modulation scheme to work at a secret rate which
approaches the equivocation rate.
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